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European efforts to create a common Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as part of the European Union’s (EU) wish
to play to stronger political role in world affairs are paradox. While officials in Brussels, on the one hand, are eagerly
developing scenarios how the EU could lead its first international mission abroad, its member countries, on the other
hand, cannot agree on ways to drastically improve defense spending or defense cooperation. Although the latter is a
goal of European integration clearly headed for the long run, it needs to be addressed now. Across Europe, too little
is spent on defense so that the EU would be able to undertake much more than peacekeeping missions like Task
Force Fox in Macedonia. In order to bridge that gap and to safeguard the success of prospective and immediate
operations, the EU and NATO are working closely to arrange the Berlin-plus agreement which would allow the EU to
drawn on NATO military assets in any given crisis. Should things turn nasty, for instance in Macedonia, the EU could
make use of planning capabilities and military tools that it still does not have. So far, however, this issue is beset by
struggles between Turkey and Greece, which both disagree on the Berlin-plus arrangements. While the Spanish EU
Presidency came close to solving the problem this year, the Greek government refused to accept a proposal made
during the Seville summit in  June that concluded Spain’s six-month presidency. This came at no surprise since
Greece  is next  on  deciding over  ESDP matters.  Its  presidency  begins January  1st,  2003  but  since  the  acting
presidency –Denmark- is not participating in the ESDP, Greece is already mandated to make decisions.
During the Spanish EU Presidency, a few issues have well been put forward. Spain has a) addressed the need to
establish a EU Defense Ministers Council, something that did not yet exist on a regular basis and b) to establish
more regular meetings of the national armament directors to enhance cross-border defense cooperation. Defense
cooperation  must  not  only  begin  at  the  industrial  level  but  be  actively  supported  and  strengthened  at  the
governmental  level. One important  step to overcome specific defense shortfalls in  the long run  -if  the defense
budgets are not increased significantly- could be specialization through an industrial  consolidation that is guided
through  government-to-government  agreements.  This  could  be  one  way  to  maintain  military  forces  that  are
interoperable with U.S. forces in the future and also maintain a European industrial base that is capable. However,
this strategy seems not to be advancing well since it touches upon some of the most fundamental national questions
of sovereignty and national interests, where consensus is only hard to achieve. Decisive countries within the EU
framework that should be driving this industrial consolidation as well as governmental cooperation -Great Britain,
France, Spain, Germany and Italy- seem to be going different paths.
Take Germany: Experts -nationally as well as internationally- are puzzled over Germany’s defense industrial policy.
The government’s and Defense Ministry’s decisions seem less rational and less predictable, the closer we go towards
the elections September 22nd. Precisely the outcome of the German elections is a determinant for the future of the
German defense industrial basis, the European defense industrial cooperation and, last but not least, the outcome of
the ESDP. Whatever coalition will form the new government in Germany, it will  have a say on how the national
industry  will  position  itself  and  what  consequences  it  will  have  for  a  market  segment  that  is  continuously
consolidating.  A  new  government  will  also  have  to  make  decisive  decisions  on  important  European  defense
collaboration programs.
While  the lucrative aerospace sector  has been  consolidating in  large parts, tendencies are  visible  in  the naval
shipbuilding and land armament sectors. In these two sectors especially, the German government still has chances
to develop and pursue a strategy. However, not for too much longer since it refused to use its potential for quite
some time. Although free market developments without pressure from governments are favorable circumstances,
the situation is much more differentiated and difficult when it comes to marketing defense goods. In many cases, the
economic prosperity of a given company here does not only depend on the national procurement side but also how a
government supports its defense industrial base and promotes it. It is not about exaggerated national lobbying but
rather supporting the ESDP process by complementing it with a strong defense industrial base. Each member state
should be in the position to bring its core industrial capabilities to the table for this process. Therefore, it is the
responsibility of every single state to position its industries for this European or transatlantic defense cooperation.
But in critical areas like the naval shipbuilding and land armament industry, the political decision-makers seem to be
lacking long-term strategic visions and initiatives.
Several  developments out  of  the  land armament,  naval  shipbuilding and missile  branches may  illustrate  this:
Completely  out  of  the blue came a decision  in  July  by the German Defense Ministry’s Procurement  Chief  that
hammered the land armament industry. The only major procurement program -the new infantry fighting vehicle
“Panther”-  had  been  cancelled,  although  the  Defense  Ministry  had  openly  supported  the  development  of  the
“Panther” only weeks before. After  renewed negotiations between the Defense Ministry  and the land armament
companies over a “replacement of the replacement” for the Marder infantry fighting vehicle, all involved came to the
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conclusion that only a new system approach would meet the Army’s operational requirements. It was a conclusion
that everybody had known before but the Ministry had put enough pressure on the land armament industry to
achieve a system development at a much reduced price. While the renewed and tough negotiations achieved a
reduction from 285 million Euro down to probably less than 200 million Euro, the game could have been brought
home smoother and with less medial outrage the program gained through the previous cancellation. The Ministry’s
argumentation  that  the  “Panther”  would not  be  delivered soon  enough  in  2008  and that  the  Army  needed a
replacement by 2004 did not stand for two reasons. First, the deliveries of the new variant, that will be produced by
Rheinmetall  Landsysteme  GmbH,  Kiel  and Krauss-Maffei  Wegmann,  Munich  through  the  joint  venture  Panther
System und Management GmbH, will occur in only few numbers in late 2005. The bulk of the 410 new infantry
fighting vehicles will  realistically come between 2006 and 2008. Secondly, the Ministry and the political decision-
makers knew all to well for quite some time that the 2135 Marder infantry fighting vehicles -now over 30 years old-
needed a suitable and speedy replacement. Large military procurement programs, not a new conclusion, simply are
time consuming.
Anything other  than  a new system approach would have left  a German land armament industry disrupted and
without a meaningful order portfolio. Not funding a new infantry fighting vehicle would therefore have significant
industrial -and defense- political consequences. Germany would run risk of losing core competencies here like in the
naval shipbuilding sector. While Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann have done their bit by creating the 50-50
joint  venture  Panther  System and Management  GmbH,  the  rest  now depends on  the  goodwill  of  the  German
government. The government previously pressured its two land armament giants to merge completely, which did
understandably not occur all that fast. However, Panther System and Management GmbH is probably a first step in
the right direction by the two system houses. It will still take some time until Germany’s land armament sector has
merged completely just as it happened in the United Kingdom with the takeover of Vickers by Alvis. Interestingly
though, the German land armament industry has been consolidating continuously over the last ten years though
which  may be a  precursor  for  the road ahead. For  instance, Rheinmetall  has taken  over  several  national  and
international  firms.  According  to  own  calculations,  the  company  has  spent  some  500  million  Euro  for  this
consolidation. Krauss-Maffei Wegmann has also acquired smaller companies on its way to become a leading main
battle  tank  manufacturer.  However,  before  one  can  continue  to  talk  about  consolidation,  the  companies need
realistic procurement programs to maximize production. However, only 15 percent of all national procurement is
spent on Army programs. At this point, more than 50 percent of this year’s procurement budget (~3.5 billion Euro)
is being spent on Air Force programs as well as 25 percent on Navy programs.
Although this change in priorities is consistent with the new way of modern war, the Army equipment in Germany’s
armed forces needs to be modernized extensively. After all, the German Army is the branch that, at this point in
time, carries the heaviest burden in Bundeswehr commitments abroad. But not so the corresponding industry sector.
Between 1989 and today, the number of employees in the business area Armored Vehicles decreased from 44.000 to
10.000. The overall order portfolio shrunk from 1.3 billion Euro to 256 million Euro per annum. With trends like
these, the defense industry is losing confidence in the German government that things will pick up. It is not only
about getting large orders but a question of  principle. Two years ago in  October 2000, the German Chancellor
Gerhard Schröder  and then-Defense Minister  Rudolf Scharping had agreed with leading officials from the naval
shipbuilding and land armament  companies  to  safeguard their  core  competencies  and to  maintain  the  system
capacity of these firms. Was this only lip service? In fact, the only ones who acted so far where foreign investors as
the prominent example of Howaldstwerke Deutsche Werft (HDW), Kiel in naval shipbuilding shows.
HDW -a leading firm in underwater shipbuilding- is now in American hands after U.S. investor One Equity Partners,
a daughter of Bank One Corp., Chicago, acquired a 75 percent share in HDW in March. This move came out of the
blue and was quite a surprise to German defense experts and government officials alike. Why would the German
government not intervene in such a sale, had it a strategic interest in safeguarding core competencies? The U.S.
does not possess the technology needed to build diesel-powered non-nuclear submarines; those that it wants to sell
to Taiwan. Although HDW officials emphasized that the core business would remain in German hands, it is clear that
a majority shareholder will be able to access all relevant company documents. With this, Germany will not be able to
keep its technology superiority in the submarine business disclosed.
What  may  be  more  worrisome:  Germany  is  turning  out  to  be  a  difficult  and  shaky  partner  in  international
cooperation programs, although its firm- and steadiness is a precondition for an effective ESDP. By this, it puts its
own defense industrial sectors at risks and casts a long shadow over Germany’s credibility as a partner for defense
cooperation. This year  still,  Germany has to make important decisions in the areas Strategic Airlift  and Missile
Industry. The longer  it  waits to decide, the more  the  national  defense  sectors will  be  affected and Germany’s
credibility will fade. Only recently, a British Defense Ministry official said that partner countries would not want to
touch  Germany  with  a  “barge  pole”  when  it  comes to  defense  cooperation.  Some of  Europe’s  largest  defense
cooperation programs ever await German parliamentary approval to be finally lifted off. They include the eight-
nation program A400M, the six-nation program Meteor medium-range air-to-air missile and the five-nation IRIS-T
short-range air-to-air missile. These programs are all  sought to give Europe some defense capabilities in crucial
areas needed to sustain future military operations in any given crisis scenario. All the more, these multi-billion Euro
programs would be effective to create high technology jobs throughout Europe. Industrial  officials have said that
A400M alone would create more than 10.000 direct jobs across Europe and 40.000 indirect jobs.
Further,  the  situation  for  the  3.400  employees  of  the  two  principal  German  missile  houses  EADS
LFK-Lenkflugkörpersystem GmbH,  Unterschleissheim and Bodenseewerk  Gerätetechnik  (BGT),  Überlingen  could
dramatically worsen, should key programs like Meteor or IRIS-T not be approved. In the event of a non-approval,
these companies could be forced to enter European or transatlantic partnerships at a much faster rate than may be
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desirable. EADS has already announced that it will try to integrated LFK into the European missile house MBDA as
the fourth national pillar by the end of the year. Meanwhile, for several reasons, the national consolidation between
LFK and BGT still  seems distant.  BGT is at  the  same time exploring ways to foster  its transatlantic ties with
Raytheon, while the U.S. company -strengthened through the huge defense boosts after Sept. 11- also seems to
have an interest in acquiring BGT totally. However, if this can be realized depends to a large extent on Diehl Stitung
& Co, which is the mother company of BGT. At this point in time, the family-owned Diehl Stiftung seems to have no
interest to sell its missile company to a U.S. investor.
Conclusion
It is not the sole responsibility of governments to pave the way for its defense industries to position themselves
strategically. But without their support, not much can be achieved either. The goal for Germany’s government must
be to achieve synergies and to try to prevent a further de-coupling of defense firms. One way of doing this is to
bring forward important procurement programs that have long been outstanding. If the country’s defense budget
maintains the current course, Germany will neither be able to fund ongoing procurement programs nor begin new
ones as of  2006. By  then, costs for  ongoing programs will  exceed by  far  the  existing procurement  budget. If
Germany really wants to buy 73 A400M, 180 Eurofighter, 1.800 IRIS-T, 600 Taurus missiles, over 1.000 infantry
fighting vehicles; 10-12 Maritime Patrol  Aircraft, 80 Tiger helicopters, 134 NH-90 transport helicopters, then the
Ministry needs more money to finance these programs. According to estimates, some 1.5 billion euros alongside the
700 million anti-terror  money per  annum would do the job! If this additional  money is not provided, then the
government  must  sharply  reduce  the  final  numbers  in  several  of  these  programs at  the  expense  of  German
credibility. In the case of the A400M or Meteor, Germany has already committed itself too deeply that it could find
an easy way out. A reduction in other programs here and there would probably be acceptable and even make sense.
Finally, what is important is that the Ministry and the national industry will work even closer together in the future.
Only  through  a  better  understanding of  each  other’s problems and necessities,  industry  can  maintain  its  core
competencies and the Ministry keep its face when it comes to big procurement programs. Perhaps, Germany but also
Europe should think about a high-representative for defense procurement affairs. What is lacking today is a chain
that links industry with government. A “Javier Solana for defense industrial purposes” could be one key to creating a
more common approach not just in national defense but perhaps also on the way to a European defense cooperation.
Without a clear German defense strategy whose goal is to maintain a strong and well-equipped Bundeswehr and a
defense industrial policy that seeks to stabilize the national and European defense cooperation could threaten the
success of ESDP and severely undermine transatlantic security and industrial relations.
Martin Agüera  is German and Spanish Correspondent for Defense News.
Annex: German Defense Budget 2001 and 2002
Spending Resorts 2001
in Billion Marks
% 2002
in Billion Marks
%
I. Service Costs
  Personnel
  Materiel
  Other Service Costs
24.157.762
4.375.107
7.057.991
51.71%
9.36%
15.11%
24.426.969
4.586.425
6.848.041
53.03%
9.96%
14.87%
II. Investment
Costs
   R & D
   Procurement
        Potential
increase
   Military
Installations
   Other Investments
2.246.084
6.822.420
997.019
1.683.497
428.830
4.81%
14.60%
3.60%
0.92%
1.659.857
6.892.356
1.196422
1.359.762
289.068
3.60%
14.96%
2.95%
0.63%
III. Efficiency
RENDITE
-25.565 -0.11%   
Plafond (without
increase potential)
         Plus
Anti-Terror Fund
after Sept. 11
46.721.844 100% 46.062.480
1.495.529
100%
Money at disposal
         with increase
46.721.844
997.701
 47.558.009
1.196.422
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potential
TOTAL 47.718.863  48.754.432  
(Defense  Budget  2002  in  comparison  to  2001;  Source:  German  Ministry  of  Defense;  The  budget  was already
delivered in Euros, but to avoid confusion, the author recounted in Deutsch Marks at the last known rate of 1 € =
DM 1.95)
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